Free Will
Free Will
In general, we intuitively believe that we have free will and act as causal agents, but is that correct? After all, the universe around us behaves in a determinate way, and we, including our brains, are physically part of that universe. So how can we be causal agents if our brains are determinate systems? Because of this, many philosophers think that free will, as a causal agent, is illusory. So what evidence is there?
The strongest evidence of free will as a causal agent may be technology. This is because the creation of technological artifacts usually involves intent. So the artifacts are intentionally designed in a sense that natural objects are not. Plants are not intentionally designed to metabolize carbon dioxide into oxygen to produce an atmosphere that is breathable by us. Evolution is not intentionally designed to produce human beings.
It could be argued that the real reason why it is almost certain that many man-made artifacts could not arise in absence of an intelligent designer is simply because there is no easy evolutionary path whereby such artifacts could arise by chance. It has nothing necessarily to do with the intended purpose. But whether this is true or not does not change the fact that many artifacts do have an intended purpose in a way that no natural objects do.
For example, if the first person to land on a newly discovered planet found dense jungle, empty beaches, and untilled soil, would she conclude that was natural? Yes. But if she found a nuclear power station, cars and all the trappings of a metropolis, would she conclude that was natural? No. She would conclude that she was in the presence of alien technology. The products of sentient beings. Why? Because the artifacts are intentionally designed.
Furthermore it is clear that such design is not possible under (hard) determinism because, in that scenario, free will is not a causal factor. So this evidence is for free will and agent causation, but against (hard) determinism.
However, there remains the question of hard and soft freewillism. In both cases intentional design is theoretically possible, as the cause is our free will. Also, in both cases there is only one outcome. I.e. All choices are determinate once they are made. The difference is whether we could have chosen otherwise.
The problem is that we never experience exactly the same circumstances again. Hence it is not possible to demonstrate that, in those circumstances, you could choose otherwise. So, although the evidence for agent causation seems strong, it remains conceivable that free will is deterministic.